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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: May 23, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting  
 on Bosnia (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIA

John Deutch

State

Secretary Christopher

JCS

Admiral William Owens

DOD

Secretary Perry

White House

Sandy Berger

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OMB

Gordon Adams

OVP

Leon Fuerth

NSCAlexander Vershbow  
Colonel Nelson DrewSummary of ConclusionsFrasure-Milosevic Negotiations:

1. Principals noted that several areas remain unresolved following Ambassador Frasure's talks in Belgrade. While the sanction reimposition mechanism is the key, others include: securing a clear recognition formula and commitment to cut off support for the Bosnian Serbs; demands for 500,000 MT oil/month; maintaining some linkage of sanctions-lifting to normalization of relations with Croatia; and deflecting the successor state issue. Principals noted the French and British pressure to "cut a deal," and conflicting reports as to whether the French were bluffing or serious about withdrawing their UNPROFOR troops if no agreement was forthcoming. They also noted the problem of uncoordinated

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Russian diplomatic approaches to Milosevic. Principals agreed to let process simmer for now with Milosevic, and to approach the French, British and Russians to stiffen resolve and restore Contact Group solidarity. (Action: State.) ~~(S)~~

Post-Withdrawal Strategy:

2. Principals agreed that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian forces, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals agreed that U.S. security assistance should largely be limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers, and that training should be by a third party if possible; they ruled out training by the U.S. on Bosnian territory. Principals agreed that this option also imposed a need to strengthen efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, and that we would maintain peacekeepers in Macedonia, reinforced if necessary. They further agreed that this approach should be put forward in a decision memorandum for the President. (Action: NSC.) ~~(S)~~

3. Principals agreed on the need for an intelligence reappraisal of the relative capabilities of the warring factions -- current, and projected against the likely situation after withdrawal if the agreed U.S. policy option is carried out. (Action: CIA.) They tasked OSD/JCS to review Bosnian training requirements in light of the forthcoming CIA reappraisal. (Action: OSD/JCS.) They also tasked the Bosnia IWG to study several unanswered questions associated with the agreed option:

- If Russia (or others) won't support full multilateral lift in the UNSC, will the U.S. pursue limited multilateral lift and/or unilateral lift?
- What if the Russians make good on their threat to arm the Serbs if lift occurs?
- What current efforts would remain in place: the No-Fly-Zone? NATO air strike decisions? Any relief efforts? If so, how and why?
- What military posture should a NATO or an allied coalition of the willing adopt to contain the fighting if withdrawal occurs? ~~(S)~~

Unanswered Questions for OPLAN 40104:

4. The Principals noted that several questions still remain unanswered regarding implementation of OPLAN 40104. They tasked

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the Bosnia IWG to continue efforts to answer questions associated with:

- Possible civilian use of NATO forces for protection;
- Assisting movement of refugees from the enclaves;
- Possible breakdown of humanitarian efforts while NATO is in place;
- How NATO would react if Serbia enters the war while NATO is in place;
- What to do about prisoners or released POWs that fall into NATO hands; and
- How to determine to whom NATO would return disputed areas. (S)

5. Principals agreed that the magnitude of the problems associated with both OPLAN 40104 implementation and post-withdrawal strategy made it imperative to keep UNPROFOR in place, and agreed to urgently approach the French to get them to reconsider their possible withdrawal from UNPROFOR. (S)

Alternatives to NATO-led UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

6. Principals noted the OSD and JCS assessments that even a limited attempt at withdrawal from the enclaves ran the risk of provoking a level of opposition from the warring parties that could rapidly escalate beyond the ability of individual national units or UNPROFOR to handle. They expressed concerns about the ability of OPLAN 40104 to deal with very limited withdrawal or repositioning efforts without provoking an all-out withdrawal operation. They agreed that, politically, it would be extremely difficult to reject a call from a troop contributing state for NATO assistance in withdrawal. They agreed that SecDef would raise these concerns in discussions this week with SACEUR. (Action: OSD.) (S)

Remaining Decisions and "Firebreak Point" for OPLAN 40104:

7. Principals noted that the U.S. Execution Order (EXORD) responding to the force Activation Request (ACTREQ) issued by NATO would be released sometime during the second week in June, and agreed that it would not commit U.S. troops to deploy outside of the U.S. (Action: JCS.) They noted that the NAC would conduct a review of the OPLAN on May 31, and that it would be asked to approve the OPLAN on June 14. They agreed that the U.S. could join consensus to approve the OPLAN without crossing a firebreak making execution of the plan inevitable. They agreed that the firebreak that we were not prepared to cross would come when the NAC considered a decision authorizing deployment of

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forces to Europe for assembly and training, probably no earlier than the third week in June. In this light, they agreed that the U.S. would not support a decision to deploy forces into Europe in support of the OPLAN until UNPROFOR withdrawal was clearly inevitable. (Note: JCS understands that SACEUR will not request any deployment of the force in Europe unless and until there is a UN decision authorizing UNPROFOR withdrawal.) ~~(S)~~

8. They agreed that SecDef would convey this position to SACEUR in discussions this week, and would ask SACEUR to clarify where and how he envisions training of the withdrawal force taking place. (Action: OSD.) ~~(S)~~

Legislative Strategy:

9. Principals noted that the next briefing on the OPLAN was scheduled to go to the SASC on Thursday, May 25, and tasked JCS and OSD to revise the briefing in light of the critique from Senator Dole's staff following the May 19 briefing to the SFRC. (Action: OSD/JCS.) They agreed that, lacking a time in which full committees could be briefed before the Memorial Day break, the OSD/JCS/State briefing team should continue efforts to provide the briefing to key Congressional leaders (e.g. Dellums, Smith) before week's end. (Action: OSD/JCS/State.) ~~(C)~~

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